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judges struggle to decide which claims of conscience merit special 
treatment and which do not. Here is the bitter irony toward which 
the squinty-eyed, bandy-legged little error born in Opelika II has 
been leading us. A doctrinal departure undertaken in the mistaken 
hope of facilitating pluralism leads to the distinctly counter-plural-
istic result of favoring some believers over others as unelected 
judges confer constitutional immunities which are beyond the 
power of ordinary legislative majorities to correct. Justice Jackson 
had it right: 
The First Amendment grew out of an experience which taught that society 
cannot trust the conscience of a majority to keep its religious zeal in the limits that a 
free society can tolerate. I do not think it any more intended to leave the conscience 
of a minority to fix its own limits. 
Insofar as their constitutional advocacy has persuaded us otherwise, 
the Jehovah's Witnesses have led us astray. 
A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS: POLITICAL THEORY, 
RELIGION, AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING. By El-
lis Sandoz.! Louisiana State University Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 
240. Cloth, $37.50. 
Steven D. Smith 2 
At least to a nonspecialist like me, recent scholarship about the 
founding generation looks like a virtual deluge. Why then do we 
need another book on this subject? The question is especially ap-
propriate in the case of Professor Ellis Sandoz's study because his 
book is hardly as elegant or readable as, say, Bernard Bailyn's work. 
Professor Sandoz's organization is not tight, and his diction is often 
irksome: the book is filled with references to such things as 
"Metaxy," "horizons" (as in the founders' "horizon" or the "hori-
zon of philosophy"), and the "tensional dimension of participatory 
reality." 
Despite these shortcomings, A Government of Laws adds an es-
sential dimension to the "liberalism versus civic republicanism" his-
tories that are now so familiar to constitutional scholars. Indeed, if 
Sandoz is right, those histories have largely missed the most impor-
tant points. In addition, by comparison to much of the recent legal-
I. Professor of Political Science, Louisiana State University; Director, Eric Voegelin 
Institute for American Renaissance Studies. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Colorado. 
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historical scholarship, Sandoz speaks more directly (in a sense I will 
try to explain) to present concerns and needs. For those reasons, 
his argument deserves close analysis. 
I 
Perhaps the most conspicuous aspect of Sandoz's study is his 
emphasis upon the religious character of the founders' thought. 
Religion, he argues, was not merely a veneer or a vocabulary; on the 
contrary, biblical precepts and symbols permeated the thinking of 
the founding generation. And it is a mistake to suppose that intel-
lectual and political leaders such as Madison and Jefferson had es-
caped the piety of the general population to achieve a secular, 
"enlightened" perspective; the intellectual elite were, if anything, 
even more deeply religious in their thinking than were less educated 
Americans. 
As he acknowledges, Sandoz is hardly the first scholar to no-
tice the importance of religion to the founding generation. His dis-
cussion of the religious element is nonetheless valuable for at least 
two reasons. First, as Sandoz repeatedly notes with evident exas-
peration, many historians and scholars seem immersed in an 
"obtuse secularism" that leads them, despite mountainous evidence 
to the contrary, to view the American founding as a principally 
secular development. I cannot say whether this indictment is valid 
with respect to professional historians, but discussions of the found-
ing period in legal literature do deserve Sandoz's criticism. To be 
sure, the founders' religiosity is sometimes considered in legal litera-
ture specifically dealing with the first amendment's religion clauses, 
but in more general discussions this dimension is commonly 
overlooked. 
A contribution to this journal can serve as an example. In an 
essay entitled "The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution: A 
Lawyer's Guide to Contemporary Historical Scholarship,"J Profes-
sor Suzanna Sherry lists four principal influences on the founders' 
thought: "Country" or Old Whig ideology, Enlightenment philoso-
phy, John Locke, and the common law tradition as expounded by 
Coke and Blackstone.4 Notice what is missing: there is no mention 
of the pervasive influence of Protestant Christianity or of the fact 
that the Bible-not Bolingbroke or Blackstone or Locke-was the 
most widely-read and cited book in America.s Noting the impor-
3. 5 CONST. COMM. 323 (1988). 
4. Id. at 337-39. 
5. Although Sherry does not actually deny the importance of religion, she does offer 
hints to that effect. Eg., id. at 329 ("Taught by the Enlightenment to reject the workings of 
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tance of "virtue" in the founders' thought, Professor Sherry pro-
ceeds to ask, "How did a society cultivate virtue?" Remembering 
statements by Washington and Jefferson asserting that religion is 
the essential foundation of republican morality, one might expect 
that this question would elicit at least a passing allusion to religion. 
But no-Sherry finds in the founders' thinking four sources of vir-
tue: broad distribution of land ownership, education, equality, and 
an inborn moral sense.6 Even with respect to education there is still 
no mention of religious instruction; instead she quotes The Worces-
ter Speculator as to the importance of "the spirit of literature." 
Reading Sherry's generally useful essay, one would have no inkling 
that religion influenced the founders' thinking in any way. 
Likewise current legal doctrine, which holds that government 
violates the Constitution if it acts in a way that even creates a per-
ception that it has "endorsed" religion, powerfully reflects such an 
"obtuse secularism." So long as such attitudes persist, arguments 
like Sandoz's will be a necessary antidote. 
But Sandoz's emphasis upon religion serves as more than a re-
minder of what we already know but are wont to forget. It also 
addresses a critical and more difficult question: What did the foun-
ders actually derive from their religious beliefs? It is conceivable, 
after all, that the founders' beliefs might have been incidentally reli-
gious but not inherently or essentially so. For example, some schol-
ars have stressed the colonial attachment to "covenant theology." 
In this vein, Donald Lutz has argued that Americans derived the 
idea of government by consent from biblical precedent, and indeed 
were practicing the idea well before they could have gotten any con-
tractarian notions from Locke. Lutz may be right, but his point 
does not suffice to show that religion was more than incidentally 
significant. Even if Americans acquired the idea of government by 
consent from the Bible, there is nothing inherently religious about 
that notion. Hence, modem secular interpreters may be right to 
downplay its religious origins as incidental. 
For Sandoz, however, religion provided the founders not just 
with a precedent for government by consent; it offered them a full-
blown "civil theology" and a "comprehensive vision of ultimate re-
ality." I will try to summarize the content of that vision in a mo-
ment. For now, it suffices to note that, in Sandoz's view, we cannot 
begin to understand the founders' thinking unless we recognize 
their "classical and Christian notions of a common human nature 
Providence as a sufficient explanation [for political corruption), eighteenth-century writers 
blamed the ways of men."). 
6. ld. at 337-39. 
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present to all men qua men and the dignity of man created in the 
divine image and loved of God." If this is so, the religious influence 
on the founders' thought can hardly be dismissed as incidental. 
Indeed, the statement just quoted (and much else of a similar 
nature) might lead one to interpret the book as a sort of "Christian 
nation" tract. But Sandoz disclaims such an interpretation, and I 
incline to believe that his disclaimer is warranted. To see why, one 
must consider another of the book's major themes-the classical el-
ement in the founders' thinking. 
II 
Everyone knows that the founders, or at least the better edu-
cated among them, studied the classics. The critical question, once 
again, is what did they learn from this study? And the answer, ac-
cording to some historians, is "not much." Bernard Bailyn sug-
gested that the founders had only a superficial grasp of what they 
read from Greek and Roman thinkers; Jefferson held Plato in con-
tempt, and John Adams thought-not implausibly, I would add-
that the Republic must have been meant as a satire. What the foun-
ders mainly derived from their classical studies, Bailyn argued, was 
a collection of inspiring stories and heroic examples demonstrating 
the need for courage and determination in the struggle against cor-
ruption and for political liberty. 
Sandoz's founders were equally zealous for liberty but less 
philosophically obtuse. From the classics, Sandoz argues, the foun-
ders derived a "comprehensive vision of ultimate reality" that of-
fered an account of the universe and of the place of mankind within 
that universe. The fact that this comprehensive vision ran parallel 
in important respects to the world view which the founders derived 
from Christian and biblical precepts allows Sandoz to speak of a 
dominant "classical and Christian" tradition, 1 and thus to avoid the 
narrower "Christian nation" interpretation. 
And what was this "comprehensive vision" or "civil theology" 
that underlay all of the founders' thought? Sandoz describes the 
vision somewhat differently at different points in the book, but a 
7. This equation of the classical and Christian traditions strikes me as a vulnerable 
point in Sandoz's argument. The biblical God, personal, loving, active in human history, 
differs dramatically from the "God of the Philosophers," as represented by Aristotle's Un-
moved Mover, passive and oblivious to things mortal; and Sandoz's argument would indicate 
that the founders were attached to the former rather than the latter deity. However, Sandoz 
sees similarities only on a very abstract level, and argues only that the classical and Christian 
traditions were compatible in the eclectic thought of the founders. That claim seems plausi-
ble; if the founders assumed a rough equation between biblical precepts and Greek philoso-
phy, they would at least not have been the first to do so. 
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succinct summary of its essential tenets would have to include the 
following. First, there is an overarching providential order with 
both physical and spiritual dimensions. Second, this order consti-
tutes an ontological hierarchy-a Great Chain of Being with levels 
and degrees ranging from the merely physical to the spiritual, from 
the inert to the divine. Third, the place of human beings within this 
hierarchy can be characterized as "In Between." Humans are in 
between the beasts and the gods; they are physical beings given to 
fleshly lusts, but are also possessed of reason and freedom which 
permit them to participate in the divine nature. Consequently, hu-
manity finds it fulfillment in "happiness (eudaimonia) or blessed-
ness (makarios)," according to the classical account, or, in the 
Christian version, in "union with God or beatitude." Finally, gov-
ernment facilitates human fulfillment by upholding a "sacred lib-
erty" that must be distinguished both from a "vulgar liberty" or 
license and from a coerced righteousness. 
This comprehensive vision, Sandoz argues, directly informed 
the establishment of constitutional government, which reflected a 
"grand but limited conception of man and government." Both 
terms-the "grand" and the "limited"-are essential, and serve to 
distinguish Sandoz's interpretation of the founders' political theory 
from competing interpretations which he rejects. Thus, unlike 
those who argue that the founders broke decisively with classical 
thought by severing the political question-How should govern-
ment be constituted?-from the ethical question-What is the good 
life for man?-Sandoz argues that the founders' political ideas were 
firmly rooted in an encompassing ethical vision. They would have 
had little patience with the modem notion-advocated by constitu-
tional scholars such as Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman-
that government must be agnostic about questions of human nature 
and of the good. But the founders would also have rejected the 
proposition, evident in the writings of some radicals and civic 
republicans, that government's job is to transform human nature, or 
to drum "civic virtue" into its citizens. Their philosophy recog-
nized, Sandoz contends, that "the notion of saving mankind 
through politics is, indeed, not only mistaken but ultimately 
disastrous." 
Eschewing the extremes of ethical agnosticism and compulsory 
virtue, Sandoz's founders adopted a middle course consistent with 
our "In Between" status. They designed a government that would 
encourage human flourishing-understood in a spiritual as well as a 
material sense-but that was carefully limited to prevent either op-
portunistic or idealistic interferences with the freedom essential to 
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that flourishing. "Liberty" and "law" were the cornerstones of this 
government. 
III 
At this point let us note a puzzle that helps to illumine the 
book's larger significance. The puzzle is that although Sandoz's os-
tensible theme concerns the intellectual character of the founding 
generation, much of his discussion seems at best distantly related to 
that theme. His important introductory chapter dwells on Plato 
and Aristotle, making barely a gesture in the direction of the Amer-
ican founders. Later he discusses and quotes some political writings 
of Thomas Aquinas, ostensibly to illumine the founders' thinking, 
even though he acknowledges that the founders would have re-
sented the insinuation that their ideas were derived from a Catholic 
philosopher. What is the point of these apparent diversions? 
That question should be considered in connection with another 
one: What is the relevance/or us of the founders' political and phil-
osophical views? Scholars such as Frank Michelman and Cass Sun-
stein have recently devoted considerable energy to presenting the 
"civic republican" notions held by the founders. But why should 
we care? If scholars of republicanism were "originalists" like Rob-
ert Bork, their historical project would be understandable; but most 
such scholars are plainly not in that camp. So even if their analyses 
of history are correct, why does it matter? Or is it simply interest-
ing intellectual history? 
For some constitutional scholars this question may be difficult 
to answer. But Sandoz's view seems clear enough, and it also pro-
vides the clue to the puzzle described earlier. Sandoz believes that 
the founders' "comprehensive vision of reality" was not merely a 
transitory phase in the ongoing flow of philosophical fashions, but 
was rather the expression of a kind of perennial philosophy that, 
despite differences of detail, had been held by the major thinkers of 
Western culture from the Greeks onward. Moreover, that philoso-
phy is of interest not merely because the founders (or anyone else) 
believed it but, more importantly, because it was-and is-true. 
Thus, Sandoz affirms that his interest is "theoretical rather than an-
tiquarian or simply historical," and he insists that the founders' phi-
losophy is worthy of study because it "retains its validity and 
vitality into the present." 
This view explains why Sandoz devotes so much attention to 
Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. He wants to show that the founding 
was not so much a modern project as a restoration and rearticula-
tion of medieval and classical ideas. Sandoz's view also provides the 
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link between the founding generation and the present. The connec-
tion lies not only in the legal contention that the founders' ideas 
were embodied in positive law-although they were-but also, and 
more importantly, in the philosophical claim that the founders' 
comprehensive vision is as valid now as it was two hundred or two 
thousand years ago. This philosophical claim is the book's truly 
important and daring contribution. 
IV 
Unfortunately, it is this philosophical claim that is also the 
hardest aspect of the book to evaluate. Sandoz never really tries to 
prove the claim; rather, he suggests that it is not susceptible to logi-
cal demonstration: 
Ultimately, the question that underlies any philosophical discussion is always Soc-
rates' question: Look and see if this is not the case . . . . Socrates means for us to 
consult the content of our own personal experience; consider the matter with our 
reason; consult with those whose opinions are worthy of consultation; and honestly 
ascertain, as far as we can, whether or not what is asserted truly conforms with the 
realities. These, then, compose the facts of our own experience, and to that we can 
give a rather strong name and speak of existential truth. 
We are confronted, then, with a depiction of a comprehensive vision 
of ultimate reality and an invitation to test that vision through a 
Socratic experiment. 
Although Sandoz cannot demonstrate that his philosophical 
claim is correct, he does argue that the founders' comprehensive 
vision is urgently needed. He notes the "contemporary crisis of the 
spirit" that afflicts Western civilization. This crisis is due in part to 
a Lockean liberalism which, by neglecting "the upper ranges of 
man's existence," has generated "grave psychic and social disor-
ders" from which "recovery is, at best, improbable." Unfortu-
nately, says Sandoz, there is little help to be derived from ideologies 
that might concur in this part of Sandoz's diagnosis-from a radi-
calism that "obliterates man by dissolving his essence into sociol-
ogy," or from a civic republicanism whose nebulous notions of civic 
virtue imply a subordination of the individual directly contrary to 
the founders' design. 
Given these forbidding alternatives, the classical and Christian 
tradition that Sandoz seeks to recover deserves reconsideration. In 
the prevailing intellectual climate it may seem alien for a serious 
scholar to claim that a particular vision of reality-especially a 
classical and Christian vision-is actually and universally true. But 
Sandoz's book will have failed of its most important purpose unless 
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his readers take the book on those terms and then perform the So-
cratic experiment he recommends. 
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 
1815-1835. By G. Edward White.t New York and London: 
Macmillan Publishing Company. 1988. Pp. xxi, 1009. Cloth, 
$95.00. 
JOHN MARSHALL'S ACHIEVEMENT: LAW, POLI-
TICS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS. 
Edited by Thomas C. Shevory .2 Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press. 1989. Pp. x, 232. Cloth, $12.95. 
Herman Be/z3 
Over two decades ago Robert Faulkner, in The Jurisprudence 
of John Marshall (1968), belatedly demolished the progressive inter-
pretation of the "Great Chief Justice" and, it might be argued, pro-
phetically resolved the debate over republican and liberal influences 
on the founding fathers and Marshall before it even began. Progres-
sive scholarship had long depicted Marshall as a conservative de-
fender of property rights and national authority who impeded the 
progress of democratic states' rights doctrines. In the years after 
Faulkner's study, scholarly controversy focused on whether the 
founders-and John Marshall as the preeminent expositor of the 
constitutional ideas of the founding-were civic-minded virtuous 
republicans, or property-minded possessive individualists. Faulkner 
viewed Marshall as a liberal or modern republican who wrote the 
principles of constitutional democracy into our fundamental law. 
Faulkner did not anticipate, however, the controversy over the na-
ture of constitutional interpretation that was to develop and that is 
now one of the major issues in Marshall scholarship. 
These two books are significant contributions to Marshall his-
toriography. By focusing on the problem of constitutional interpre-
tation, they supplement Faulkner's work. Both books address the 
question of republican and liberal tendencies in the thought of Chief 
Justice Marshall. White and Shevory also examine Marshall in re-
lation to the issues of judicial activism and public policymaking. In 
I. Professor of Law, University of Virginia. 
2. Assistant Professor of Politics, Ithaca College. 
3. Professor of History, University of Maryland. 
